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POLICY CHALLENGE
It is too early to determine if and how policy integration within the euro
area will develop beyond its current limited monetary and budgetary remit.
Alternative scenarios can be envisaged, from the building of a coherent
euro area within the EU, to a fragmentation of the financial market and a
generalised ‘variable geometry’. Policy action should be based on the need
to (a) make room for deeper integration within the euro area, beyond the
limited remit envisaged in the Lisbon treaty; (b) preserve the integrity of
the EU27 and its essential gover-
nance arrangements; (c) ensure
equal treatment in the application
of common rules; (d) ensure that
candidates for euro-area member-
ship have a voice in the definition
of its rules; and (e) balance the
requirements of legal clarity,
accountability and efficiency with
the desirability of experimenta-
tion through variable geometry.
Overlapping and complex governance
THE ISSUE The euro crisis and subsequent policy responses have
challenged the assumptions underpinning the governance of the euro area,
and the relationship between the European Union’s euro- and non-euro
countries. The euro policy regime has become increasingly complex and
difficult to manage, raising the question of the accountability of decision
making to citizens. Complexity also threatens to create frustration for euro-
area members, which fear that initiatives to strengthen the euro will be
hindered, and for non-euro members, which fear that they will be de-facto
deprived of their say in decisions of major relevance to them.
Source: Bruegel.
EU27
Euro
area
Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and
Governance
(‘Fiscal Compact’)
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
02
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1. This Policy Brief is an
edited version of a
paper prepared for the
informal ECOFIN of 30
March 2012 at the
invitation of the Danish
Presidency of the EU
Council.
THE EURO CRISIS and the way poli-
cymakers have responded have
challenged the assumptions
underpinning the euro-area's gov-
ernance, and the relationship
between the European Union's
euro- and non-euro countries. As
more steps are taken in response
to the weaknesses in the euro
policy regime revealed by the
crisis, the EU will face new chal-
lenges of the same sort. This Policy
Brief provides input to the policy
discussion on the governance of
the EU/euro area relationship1.
The governance model of what
could be called EMU 1.0 was
based on three assumptions:
first, that Economic and Monetary
Union only required, in addition to
EU single market provisions, dele-
gation of monetary policy to the
common central bank and the
avoidance of excessive budget
deficits; second, that governance
could be grounded on rules-based
prevention only, and that there
was no need for crisis manage-
ment; third, that all EU countries
would eventually join EMU (at
least those without a waiver).
These assumptions made the
governance of the EU/euro area
relationship relatively simple.
Euro-area relevant provisions
could be designed as a self-con-
tained set of rules applicable to
euro members, and those rules
interfered minimally with the gen-
eral rules applicable to all EU
members. Single market integra-
tion was seen as contributing to
the strengthening of the euro,
while being beneficial to all. Gov-
ernance could rely on the
machinery of the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN)
for the implementation of formal
rules, while the Eurogroup, con-
sisting of the finance ministers of
euro-area countries – a late addi-
tion to the governance framework
– limited itself to the monitoring
of economic developments and
the preparation of ECOFIN deci-
sions relating to the Excessive
Deficit Procedure.
This barebones EMU failed the
test posed by the crisis. It is now
recognised that a sustainable cur-
rency union requires more
governance because of the higher
degree of economic, financial and
fiscal spillovers than those exist-
ing outside the currency union:
• Beyond strengthening of budg-
etary discipline, decisions
since 2009 include the cre-
ation of a crisis management
and resolution mechanism;
prevention initiatives in fields
such as competitiveness and
its determinants, macroeco-
nomic imbalances, and
financial stability; and the
gradual build-up of a hands-on
euro governance structure
that functions in a markedly
more discretionary way than
before the crisis. Further dis-
cussions suggest that the
strengthening of the euro area
could eventually have other
consequences such as access
to specific budgetary
resources, banking regulation
and supervision, public-debt
management and political
union. These developments are
blurring the previously clear
distinction between euro-area
and EU management.
• The crisis has led to a recogni-
tion that for individual
countries, participation in the
single currency is more
demanding than initially per-
ceived. Although all but two of
the EU27 are formally commit-
ted to joining the euro, there is
agreement that the economic
preconditions for successful
participation must be met
before the irrevocable locking
of exchange rates. This opens
up the possibility that the
coexistence between euro-
area members and a relatively
large group of non-euro EU
members will last for longer
than initially assumed.
• The Eurogroup has increas-
ingly assumed the role of a
de-facto executive body. 
Two other factors make the dis-
cussion about the relationship
between EU and euro-area gover-
nance difficult. First, these
groupings are not stable, and this
results in differences in attitudes:
non-euro countries that do not
intend to join in the near future
are primarily interested in limiting
spillover effects from euro-area
decisions onto the wider EU, while
countries that want to join the
euro are concerned to avoid a sit-
uation in which it becomes
increasingly difficult to join a
more deeply integrated euro area.
Second, the two categories of
country are not homogeneous
legally, economically and politi-
cally. Even among the current 17
euro-area members, there are sig-
nificant differences that imply
different appetites for integration.
These two factors make it difficult
to rely on the basic rule that all
rules for EU/euro-area relation-
ship should simply be defined by
all EU countries together.
Until now, the EU has dealt prag-
matically with this complexity.
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2. Article 136 of the
consolidated Treaty on
the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU).
3. Article 137 of the
TFEU.
4. A set of five regula-
tions and one directive
dealing with economic
and fiscal surveillance
that entered into force
at the end of 2011. See
http://ec.europa.eu/eco
nomy_finance/articles/
governance/2012-03-
14_six_pack_en.htm.
The basic governance model has
been retained while new compo-
nents have been added either at
euro-area level (for example the
European Stability Mechanism),
at EU level (for example the Euro-
pean Semester), or in ad-hoc
formats (as for the Euro Plus Pact
or the Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance (TSCG)).
As a consequence, the decision-
making system has been made
more complex and difficult to
manage, bringing into question its
perception by, and accountability
to, citizens. Complexity could also
create frustration among both
euro- and non-euro members.
Euro-area members fear that ini-
tiatives deemed essential for
strengthening the euro will be hin-
dered by excessive governance
complexity resulting from the
demands of non-euro members,
who fear in turn that they will be
de facto deprived from having
their say in decisions of major rel-
evance to them.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GOV-
ERNANCE AND CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE EURO AREA/NON-EURO
AREA RELATIONSHIP
Pre-crisis governance distin-
guished between euro-area
countries and non-euro area
countries. ECOFIN plays a central
role in EU economic decision
making. A number of decisions
related to the euro area can, how-
ever, be taken by the ECOFIN with
only euro-area countries voting.
Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty estab-
lished a stronger role for
euro-area countries in preparing
and finalising recommendations
and decisions on budgetary disci-
pline and broad economic policy
guidelines2. The Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) in principle
applies to all 27 EU member
states. However, sanctions are
foreseen only for the euro-area
member states. Moreover, only
euro-area countries can vote on
Excessive Deficit Procedure steps
that involve only euro-area coun-
tries. The Eurogroup was given a
treaty-based role by the Lisbon
Treaty3. However, formal deci-
sions can only be taken by
ECOFIN, and the Eurogroup is
therefore the forum for deeper
discussions among euro-area
finance ministers, for example on
matters related to the implemen-
tation of the SGP.
The first governance reforms to
address the weaknesses laid bare
by the crisis stayed within the
Treaty’s remits and implicitly
deepened the legal and institu-
tional gap between euro-area and
non-euro area countries. Most of
the so-called Six-Pack reforms4
are based on the Lisbon Treaty
and therefore perpetuate the clear
distinction between euro-area
and non-euro area countries. In
particular, regulation 1175/2011
on the strengthening of the sur-
veillance of budgetary positions
applies to the EU27, but the asso-
ciated sanctions refer to the euro
area. Regulation 1176/2011 on
the prevention and correction of
macroeconomic imbalances also
applies to the whole EU. However,
the alert mechanism, which is
part of the regulation, is, in accor-
dance with Article 121(3) of the
TFEU, discussed in the Eurogroup
for the euro-area countries. Also,
the so-called Scoreboard, which
forms the basis of the alert mech-
anism, distinguishes between
euro-area and non-euro area
countries. Finally, the enforce-
ment mechanism to correct
excessive macroeconomic imbal-
ances adopted as part of the Six
Pack is exclusively addressed to
euro-area countries (Regulation
1174/2011). For the most part,
the regulations require qualified
majority voting (QMV) by the
Council to adopt a European Com-
mission recommendation. For
euro-area countries, only euro-
area countries vote. Overall, the
Six Pack strengthened euro-area
governance, and by doing so, the
legislation increased the gap
between euro-area and non-euro
area countries. Indeed, stronger
and more binding rules for euro-
area countries imply a wider legal
gap and may also result in diverg-
ing economic policy stances.
The Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance (TSCG)
marks a significant change to the
governance of the EU, and
exposes the growing tension
between national sovereignty
and supra-national logic. The new
treaty has two main elements.
Articles 3-8 cover the so-called
Fiscal Compact, which requires
the main elements of the SGP to
be transposed into national legis-
lation at a constitutional or
equivalent level. The correctness
of the transposition into national
law can be challenged in the EU
Court of Justice (ECJ). At the
same time, national parliamen-
tary prerogatives are safe-
guarded. This implies that ulti-
mately, the ECJ may have to judge
if a transposition into national law
of the TSCG provisions concerning
the fiscal Correction Mechanism
– while not in line with the
requirements – may nevertheless
be lawful, because the national
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parliamentary prerogative pre-
vails (Article 3(2) of the TSCG).
Articles 9-14 deepen governance
inter alia by establishing regular
Euro Summits. Overall, the new
treaty renders the tension
between national sovereignty
and the logic of supra-national
intervention clearly visible.
The TSCG also creates a new ‘vari-
able geometry’ according to
which countries cannot be easily
classified into euro area and non-
euro area. Already the directive on
requirements for budgetary
frameworks of the member
states, which is part of the Six
Pack, marks a departure from the
euro-area/non-euro area frame-
work. The directive is addressed
to all EU members, although the
United Kingdom has an exemp-
tion from a number of the
directive's main provisions. The
TSCG will enter into force when 12
euro-area countries have ratified
it. Its content will then apply to all
countries that have ratified it
including non-euro area countries
to the extent that they chose to
opt-in. The new Euro Summit illus-
trates the potential for ‘variable
geometry’. The Euro Summit pres-
ident is elected by the heads of
state and government of those
euro-area countries that have rat-
ified the TSCG. Each year, the
heads of state and government of
all countries that have ratified the
treaty will meet in a Euro Summit.
It is thus conceivable that there
will be a Euro Summit involving
several non-euro countries but
excluding one or several euro-
area countries (TSCG, Article 12).
On the financial supervisory front,
the new institutions that have
been created are in principle insti-
tutions for the whole EU, but some
differentiation between euro-area
and non-euro countries is becom-
ing visible. For example, the
European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) gives a leadership role to
the European Central Bank, which
finances the ESRB secretariat.
There is also an emerging debate
on the use of macroprudential
instruments to differentiate
between euro-area countries in
order to mitigate the unintended
consequences of a single mone-
tary policy. The ESRB may
eventually make macroprudential
policy recommendations to euro-
area countries that would not
apply to non-euro area countries
with an independent monetary
policy. Similarly, the European
Banking Authority (EBA) is an
EU27 institution. However, in the
context of the currently debated
Two Pack legislation5, the EBA will
play a special role for the euro-
area countries by requiring
euro-area members in financial
difficulties to report additional
information to the EBA6.
In terms of financial assistance,
the model has become more cen-
tred on the euro-area countries. At
the start of the euro sovereign
debt crisis, there was uncertainty
about the responsibility for
macrofinancial assistance for
euro-area countries, since no
such assistance was foreseen in
the EU Treaty. For Greece, there
was a temporary coexistence of
different instruments (bilateral
loans, European Financial Stabil-
ity Facility). For other countries
receiving financial assistance,
variable geometries were estab-
lished, with some non-euro area
countries participating in the
assistance given to Ireland. The
current model appears to focus on
the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), which will be an instru-
ment for euro-area countries only.
However, the ESM Treaty only
grants access to financial assis-
tance to those euro-area
countries that have ratified the
TSCG. Financial assistance to non-
euro area countries will continue
to come from the EU-based bal-
ance-of-payments assistance, as
foreseen by the EU Treaty. The IMF
involvement in financial assis-
tance further complicates the
situation because it implicitly
gives a voice to all EU (and also
non-EU) countries in assistance
packages for all euro-area and
non-euro area countries.
The crisis has affected the rela-
tive roles of Council formations
and increased the role of intergov-
ernmental decisions. In 2010-11,
decisions were often taken by the
EU’s heads of state and govern-
ment, even though they were
often technically within the remit
of finance ministers. Many deci-
sions were also taken on the
basis of ad-hoc intergovernmen-
tal deliberations. However, there
is a view that the Eurogroup has
gained in importance relative to
the ECOFIN7. In addition to stan-
dard fiscal surveillance decisions,
the Eurogroup has in particular
been the key body taking deci-
sions to address programme
reviews, the Greek private sector
involvement and the fragility of
the banking system. While non-
euro area countries seem to
recognise that it is legitimate that
euro-area countries discuss such
matters in the Eurogroup, some
deplore the absence of a real
ECOFIN discussion on these mat-
ters, even though events in
5. See Table 1 (page 8).
6. See Article 3 of the
proposal, part of the
Two Pack, for a
regulation on the
strengthening of
economic and
budgetary surveillance
of member states
experiencing or
threatened with serious
difficulties with respect
to their financial
stability in the euro
area. See Table 1 on
page 8.
7. The senior officials
interviewed as
background for this
paper generally agreed
on this point.
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8. These statements
are based on
conclusions drawn from
our interviews with
senior officials.
9. Such a fiscal union is
described in
Marzinotto, Sapir and
Wolff (2011), ‘What
kind of fiscal union?’,
Policy Brief 2011/06,
Bruegel.
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EU can be characterised by (1) an
increasing legal, institutional and
policy divide between euro-area
and non-euro-area member
states, (2) increasing variable
geometry blurring the euro-
area/non-euro area distinction,
(3) high complexity and lack of
clarity, and (4) increasing ten-
sions between the demands of
national sovereignty and euro-
area sovereignty.
In conclusion, the current set-up
is the source of two separate ten-
sions. First, some euro-area
countries fear that they will per-
manently have to make financial
transfers while recipient coun-
tries find the conditions
associated with such transfers
overly demanding. Second, for the
euro-area and non-euro area
countries, the complexity of the
current set-up implies a signifi-
cant drag on economic efficiency. 
RECONSIDERING THE ALLOCATION
OF COMPETENCES
There is general agreement that
the current state of affairs is
unsatisfactory. Broadly speaking,
the dissatisfaction is seen,
depending on the observer, as
stemming from one or both of the
following two issues:
• An unsatisfactory decision-
making process, taking the
current allocation of compe-
tences between the euro-area
and non-euro area countries as
a given.
• An unsatisfactory allocation of
competences between euro-
area and non-euro area
countries.
We postpone to the next section
the discussion on how to improve
the decision-making process.
Here we concentrate on three sce-
narios for redefining the
allocation of competences
between euro-area and non-euro
area countries, and examine their
implications for the decision-
making process: 
1 A two-speed EU, with a coher-
ent euro area.
2 A fragmented EU, with frag-
mentation even within the
euro area.
3 A generalised variable geome-
try EU, with variable geometry
even within the euro area.
Scenario 1 would imply that the
euro area evolves from a mone-
tary union with some fiscal rules
to a full-fledged monetary union,
with a fiscal and banking union. It
would have a strong, democrati-
cally-legitimate political centre
able to impose on national budg-
etary decisions, a federal budget
with direct access to tax
resources providing some degree
of stabilisation to the national
entities and a public debt man-
agement capability. It would also
have a banking supervisor, a
banking deposit insurance mech-
anism and a banking resolution
authority. A monetary union with
such fiscal and banking union
would achieve the kind of eco-
nomic coherence and efficiency
that the euro area has lacked so
far, and thus would seem highly
desirable9. It would also imply
that the euro area becomes de
facto a political union, with major
economic policy areas trans-
ferred from the national to the
euro-area level, thereby reducing
the tensions that result from
the current intergovernmental
Greece or other euro-area coun-
tries have clear implications for
non-euro area countries. Some
non-euro area countries also felt
that the application of common
rules could become uneven
because the same rules were de
facto applied differently by the
Eurogroup and the ECOFIN8.
With increasing variable geome-
try, the decision-making process
has also become more complex.
Voting rules are becoming more
complex involving different
groups of countries in different
cases. Different member states
participate in the financial assis-
tance programmes. In the context
of the European Semester, the
Commission, the Council and the
European Parliament provide ex-
ante guidance to national
decisions relating to fiscal policy
and national reform programmes.
At the same time, more and more
crucial decisions have been
shifted from finance ministers to
heads of state and government,
who typically take decisions on
the basis of consensus. Many
observers have equated this
development with a strengthen-
ing of the inter-governmental
nature of decision making. The
ESM further adds to institutional
and practical complexity by creat-
ing an intergovernmental
institution that operates outside
the regular treaty, and by defining
a completely new decision-
making structure. At the same
time, the TSCG – while being inter-
governmental – has strengthened
the European Commission’s role
by introducing reversed qualified
majority voting on EDP steps.
Overall, the current legal, institu-
tional and political reality of the
approach. While the Treaty allows
for stronger euro-area gover-
nance based on Article 136,
scenario 1 may require a stronger
legal base, and could have impli-
cations for national constitutions.
To the extent that it would deliver
a more stable and better function-
ing monetary union, this
development would benefit the
whole EU. It would however result
in a two-speed EU, with the EU27
becoming essentially the EU11, ie
the coherent euro area plus a bloc
of 10 non-euro area members.
This would raise the big economic
question of the coexistence
between the EU single market
and the economic policies man-
aged by the euro area. Would it be
possible, within the EU, to pre-
serve the integrity of the single
market while permitting euro-
area countries to manage their
economic, fiscal and financial
affairs in a manner that is coher-
ent with their monetary union?
A particularly important issue in
this respect is banking regulation
and supervision: a coherent euro
area would presumably develop
into a banking union with inte-
grated supervision, yet banking
regulation would remain an EU27
competence. This could create a
tension between the require-
ments of financial stability and
those of financial market integra-
tion, as perceived at EU level.
A euro area acting in a unified
manner would presumably have a
qualified majority within the
Council. Thus the two-speed EU
might resemble the European
Economic Area (EEA), with the
euro area playing the role of the
EU and the non-euro area that of
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the non-EU EEA countries. In other
words the euro area might simply
decide on single market issues, to
which QMV applies, and the non-
euro area would have to abide by
the euro area's decisions. History
has shown however that the EEA
model is not really attractive and
only a few non-EU countries have
been willing to join it. Similarly
most (but not necessarily all)
non-euro area countries would
probably not want to remain
inside the EU if it meant that the
euro-area countries dictate single
market policy.
To find a balance between poten-
tially conflicting interests, it
would be necessary to establish
rules for the relationship between
the euro area and the non-euro
area countries. In exchange for
moving more competences to
euro-area level, procedures for
governance should be estab-
lished to guarantee that no
decisions are taken that
adversely affect the fundamental
economic interests of the non-
euro area countries. Alternatively,
non-euro area countries could be
allowed to adopt different regula-
tions to the euro area for certain
matters, which would introduce
some form of regulatory competi-
tion between the euro area and
non-euro area groupings.
Scenario 2 would be the opposite
of scenario 1, with the majority of
(rather than perhaps just a few)
euro-area members deciding that
they are unwilling to cede further
fiscal and financial sovereignty. A
situation in which euro-area
countries would only accept lim-
ited common disciplines in the
budgetary field, would resist sig-
nificant moves towards economic
integration and would judge that
banking supervision and resolu-
tion need to remain a purely
national prerogative, would, in
times of crisis, as we have wit-
nessed to a degree recently, and
perhaps even in normal times,
likely lead to the fragmentation of
financial markets and perhaps
even product markets. This situa-
tion of ‘one money, but several
financial markets’ would effec-
tively mean several co-existing
monetary policies within the euro
area (probably in the disguise of
macroprudential measures), and
therefore the degeneration of the
monetary union and the EU itself.
Scenario 3 would see not only the
continuation but even the further
development of the variable-
geometry architecture witnessed
in recent months. In addition to
having most euro-area and some
non-euro area countries sign and
(in principle) ratify the TSCG
treaty, one could see in the future
some euro-area and some non-
euro area countries sign other
intergovernmental treaties, prima-
rily aimed at reinforcing the fiscal
and financial dimensions of EMU.
We would then have a series of
intergovernmental treaties signed
and ratified by different groupings
of countries, some within and
others outside the euro area.
Compared to scenario 1, this
would have the advantage of
being less confrontational since
the dividing lines between group-
ings would be blurred. However,
scenario 3 would not achieve the
kind of decision making coher-
ence and efficiency necessary to
ensure the smooth functioning of
the monetary union.
Scenario 3 is not unrealistic. But
it must be asked if this gener-
alised variable geometry can be
stable, or if it only represents a
transition towards scenarios 1 or
2. This would partly depend on the
modus operandi for the relation-
ship between euro-area and
non-euro area countries, and if it
would permit this scenario to
serve as a way to explore and
experiment with ways of develop-
ing a more coherent euro area,
while preserving the integrity of
the single market. A modus
operandi involving the strength-
ening of common institutions
such as the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament
would be helpful for an evolution
towards scenario 1. Clearly
basing variable geometry on EU
treaty-based enhanced coopera-
tion instead of intergovernmental
treaties (or integrating such
treaties into the EU Treaty, as
envisaged in the TSCG) would be
conducive to such evolution. By
contrast, a complex web of inter-
governmental agreements lacking
strong common institutions
would increase the likelihood of
an evolution towards scenario 2.
IMPROVING THE CURRENT DECI-
SION MAKING PROCESS 
A number of measures can be
envisaged that would create the
conditions for a smooth relation-
ship between euro-area and
non-euro area countries within
the current set-up. Some meas-
ures would deal with the
Eurogroup/ECOFIN relationship,
for example the exchange of infor-
mation and the possibility of
having informal discussions
between euro-area and non-euro
area countries on matters that
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concern primarily the euro area
but have major repercussions for
other EU countries. 
The tougher question is how to
improve the decision-making
process to meet the requirement
for a well-functioning and stable
EMU, while minimising the poten-
tial detrimental impact on
non-euro area EU countries. This
issue can be framed as spillover
management. A lesson from the
crisis is that spillovers from
national developments within the
euro area are more extensive than
initially thought, implying a need
for more integration and coordina-
tion beyond the traditional remit of
EMU. At the same time, spillovers
from the euro area onto non-euro
area members are significant,
meaning that non-euro area inter-
ests must be taken into account in
decision-making processes.
Our analysis suggests that five
objectives should guide decisions
on governance arrangements:
1 Make room for deeper integra-
tion within the euro area, over
and above the limited remit
envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty;
2 Preserve the integrity of the
EU27 and its essential gover-
nance arrangements;
3 Ensure equal treatment in the
application of common rules;
4 Ensure that EU members that
are candidates for euro-area
membership have a voice in
the definition of the euro area's
core principles and rules;
5 Balance the requirements of
legal clarity, accountability and
efficiency with the desirability
of experimentation through
variable geometry.
In the short term, meeting these
objectives may require several
adjustments to the current insti-
tutional set-up:
• The euro area continues to rely
on the EU's institutional and
legal machinery for implement-
ing decisions. Should it equip
itself with specific policy plan-
ning capabilities in order to be
able to map out options for its
own development?
• The European institutions have
only partially adapted to the
euro-area/EU duality. Given
current portfolios, would it be
desirable to involve a larger
group of Commissioners in the
dialogue with the Eurogroup,
for example the Commission-
ers responsible for financial
services and for employment?
• National parliaments within
the euro area are increasingly
concerned about the potential
public finance consequences
of euro-area initiatives. Should
consideration be given to form-
ing a euro-area parliamentary
finance committee made up of
representatives of the Euro-
pean Parliament's Committee
on Economic and Monetary
Affairs and finance commit-
tees of national parliaments of
euro-area countries?
• The combination of a fixed
Eurogroup chair and rotating
ECOFIN chairs is adding to
imbalances between the two
formations. Should permanent
chairing arrangements be con-
sidered for the ECOFIN? In
order to ensure consistency,
should the ESRB model, with a
permanent chair from the euro
area (who would also chair the
Eurogroup) and a vice-chair
from a non-euro area country,
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be used for ECOFIN?
• As far as euro membership is
concerned, heterogeneity is
high among non-euro area
countries, in terms of both
legal status and policy objec-
tives. Should countries that
intend to join the euro within,
say, five years be part of policy
conversations with a bearing
on the euro area’s future?
• The Eurogroup is the de-facto
decision making body for deci-
sions that only apply to
euro-area members, and this
reality is widely accepted by
non-euro area countries as it
reflects broader and deeper
coordination needs within the
euro area. Is such acceptance
our scenario 1, should a politi-
cal agreement be sought on
the definition of a supermajor-
ity rule within the ECOFIN in
order to prevent EU27 deci-
sions that are against the vital
interest of non-euro area coun-
tries being taken, in particular
when there is a risk of conflict
with the single market?
This paper draws partly on inter-
views with senior officials of EU
member states and European
institutions, to whom we are
grateful for having shared their
views with us. Opinions expressed
in this paper are those of the
authors alone. We thank Dana
Andreicut for excellent research
subject to certain red lines?
How could ECOFIN and espe-
cially the ministers from
euro-area candidate countries
be involved in the framing of
the future evolution of the
euro-area? Should this simply
involve an ex-ante information
exchange on major decisions
affecting jurisprudence or
should participation in the
shaping of these decisions
also be considered? For new
legislation, should all euro-
area candidate countries be
included in the negotiations,
but without voting rights?  
• If the euro area was to develop
into a coherent set-up with a
single voice along the lines of
Six-Pack
item
Regulation/
Directive No.
Six-Pack Regulation Applies to: Voting
rule
1 1175/2011 Improving budgetary positions and economic
policies
EU27 (with minor exceptions which only apply to euro
area+ERM2)
1
2 1177/2011 Improving the excessive deficit procedure EU27, ECB surveillance only applies to euro area+ERM2
countries
N/A
3 2011/85/EU
(Directive)
Budgetary frameworks requirements EU27, the UK does not have to abide by Articles 5 to 7
(concerning numerical fiscal rules)
N/A
4 1176/2011 Macroeconomic imbalances EU27 2
5 1173/2011 Enforcing euro area budgetary surveillance Euro area 2
6 1174/2011 Correcting excessive imbalances Euro area 3
Two- Pack
item
Regulation
No.
Two-Pack regulation
1 385/2011 Surveillance for member states with financial
stability difficulties
Euro area 3
2 0386/2011 Common provisions for draft budgetary plans
and excessive deficit correction 
Euro area in general (with minor exceptions for members who are subject
to macro-economic adjustment programmes or already subject to an
excessive deficit procedure)
3
Agreement
Fiscal Compact (TSCG) EU25 (the UK and the Czech Republic are left out) 4
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty Euro area 5
Voting rules: 1 = QMV, excluding the member state concerned (only euro-area countries vote on euro-area members), Council can
reject Commission recommendation by simple majority. 2 = QMV, excluding the member state concerned. 3 = QMV of euro-area
countries, excluding the member state concerned. 4 = Reversed QMV (euro-area countries). 5 = QMV or mutual agreement by the
Board of Directors and the Board of Governors.
Table 1: Increasingly complex decision making
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